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The field of white collar crimes, an area so unique in so many
significant respects has, up until now, been avoided by the average
practitioner. Since these prosecutions normally involve businessmen
and professionals, a lawyer who does not usually handle criminal
matters is likely to become involved. It is at this point when the
attorney chosen should not only know his criminal law but should also
be thoroughly familiar with the special problems attached to the white
collar crimes. This is where Defending Business and White Collar
Crimes achieves its greatness. Not only does it deal with the particular
areas of white collar crimes, but it also gives a thorough and highly
sophisticated course in criminal defense tactics that will be useful to
the novice and expert alike.
Its forthright, to the point manner reveals proven and tested
methods of handling all phases of a white collar case. It guides the
reader from the time the client walks into the office with respect to
interview and retainer. It continues through bail motions, pre-trial
discovery, suppression, severance and change of venue. Actual trial
tactics are thoroughly discussed, along with hints and tips that could
only be gleaned from these expert authors. General defenses are care-
fully explained. Actual white collar crimes are divided into chapters
and expertly analyzed element by element. Matters peculiar to these
crimes are highlights and specific tactics and defenses are discussed.
Summation material and requests to charge are supplied.
No more need an attorney shy away from a tax fraud prosecution
or a complicated bankruptcy, fraud or conspiracy case. It is all there
in Defending Business and White Collar Crimes and it is a must for
every attorney.
Stanley E. Preiser*
TIM WAMIEN COUaTS CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY. By Howard Ball.
Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1971.
Pp. 256. $10.00.
Howard Ball's critical study of Supreme Court cases dealing with
legislative reapportionment focuses on two questions: (1) What were
the conceptions of democracy expressed by the Justices? and (2)
Which of the opinions, if any, could be called reasonable? The crux
of the matter is stated by Justice Douglas in Baker v. Carr, in his
concurring opinion, in which he said that "It is that the conception of
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political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth Amendment, the Seventeenth
Amendment, the Nineteenth Amendment can mean only on thing
-one person, one vote."
The writer stresses the point that "Equality in voting-one man
and every man, one vote-does not, by any means, solve all the
problems of democracy, but without it democracy is a sham." Further,
he says that "political equality is essential to the maintenance of a
stable, pluralist democratic system because it presupposes competive-
ness, visibility, responsiveness, and accessibility for all interests who
wish to involve themselves in the formulation, changing, or blocking
of public policies." The author suggests that the apportionment con-
troversy is crucial for the democratic system, yet he realizes the pro-
cedural character of democracy.
Mr. Ball seems to suggest that majoritarianism guarantees social
change. Yet there is no definite thesis in the total American historical
context that the effective will of the voting majority inevitably under-
writes social change. To the contrary, social change in the last twenty
years has been spearheaded by the Supreme Court, the Congress, and
the President. In any event, the substantive content of economic and
social theories requires leadership not necessarily connected with
the voting masses.
The author emphasizes the fallibility of men and an open-ended
society, which means that political institutions and process should not
block the possibility of change. In his study of the cases, he determines
whether the Justices have employed the fallibilistic concept and
whether their decisions were reasonable from the viewpoint of
empirical orientation.
The reader gets the feeling that Mr. Ball is setting up his own
criterion of political philosophy and social teleology rather than trying
to get inside the minds of the Justices writing the opinions. Actually,
social and political philosophy are one thing, juridical and constitutional
principles are something else. Under the Supremacy Clause of the
Federal Constitution and the Court organization, the decision of the
Supreme Court is the last word, whether it acts "reasonably" under
the Ball concept or not. The author puts his seal of approval on the
majority of the Court in enunciating the "one man, one vote, one
value" as being a necessary and vital institutional value in a society
that based its political activities on the principles of universal suffrage
and the representative assembly. Thus, Ball writes, the Court majority
acted "reasonably primarily because it protected, enforced, and gen-
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erally maintained the basic societal symbols-democracy, representa-
tive government, and political equality-in an era of rapid change."
He cites Chief Justice Warren's summation in the Reynolds opinion
that "representative government is, in essence, self-government through
the medium of elected representatives of the people" and that "logically,
in a society grounded on representative government, it would seem
reasonable that a majority of the people of a state could elect a
majority of that state's legislators. To conclude differently, and to
sanction minority control of state legislative bodies, would appear to
deny majority rights in a way that far surpasses any possible denial of
minority rights that might otherwise be thought to result." Political
equality, the "mainspring of representative government, meant, to
these justices, one man, one vote." The majority opinions since
Baker (and Black's minority opinion in Colegrove) said implicitly and
explicitly that there must be equal weight and equal representation for
equal numbers of people.
The author points out that the view of Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan, that the court not wander into the political thicket, was not
reasonable nor rational. Justice Frankfurter, in his opinions in the
apportionment cases of Colegrove and Baker, exemplified his primary
concern "for the continued viability of the Supreme Court in the
American Federal system." "The Court's authority," he said in Baker,
"possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must
be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and ap-
pearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting
itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements." "The
Court, by entering the political thicket, disregards the inherent limits
of its power."
The writer concludes that "In elevating the one man, one vote
concept as a basic constitutional requisite of representative govern-
ment, the 'majoritarians' were attempting to have state legislators act
to narrow the gap between theory and reality."
Charles W. Runyan*
Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky since 1964. A.B.,
Western Kentucky University; J.D. 1940, University of Kentucky. Admitted to
practice before The Supreme Court of the United States and The United States
Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit; member of Franklin County and Kentucky State Bar
Associations.
1972.]
